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Abstract
Environmental models are playing an increasingly important role in
most jurisdictions and giving rise to disputes. Despite this fact, lawyers
and policy-makers have overlooked models and not engaged critically
with them. This is a problematic state of affairs. Modelling is a
semi-autonomous, interdisciplinary activity concerned with developing
representations of systems and is used to evaluate regulatory behav-
iour to ensure it is legitimate. Models are thus relevant to lawyers and
policy-makers but need to be engaged with critically due to technical,
institutional, interdisciplinary and evaluative complexities in their op-
eration. Lawyers and policy-makers must thus think more carefully
about models and in doing so reflect on the nature of their own dis-
ciplines and fields.
Keywords: Models, environmental regulation, science and law,
administrative decision-making
This article is about the important and complex role that models play in envir-
onmental regulation. While models tend to be perceived as inanimate, tech-
nical inputs for environmental decision-making, in truth models are
contingent on numerous policy-relevant assumptions and framing decisions
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for which policy-makers should be centrally involved. In this piece, we discuss
not only the key role that lawyers and policy-makers should play in the devel-
opment and use of models, but highlight for these non-scientific groups the
inner workings of models so that they can better appreciate their contributions.
Despite our focus on the inner working of models, however, no specialist ex-
pertise in modelling is required of our readers. Nor will we dazzle you with
numbers, bamboozle you with language, or overwhelm you with diagrams.
Our purpose is simultaneously more modest and more challenging. It is more
modest because our aim is to provide an overarching conceptual explanation
of why environmental models are relevant to lawyers and policy-makers, and
why, because they are relevant, lawyers and policy-makers must critically
engage with models. Achieving this objective is more challenging, because nei-
ther the relevance nor the need for critical engagement is self-evident to law-
yers and policy-makers.
The structure of this article is as follows. First, we briefly review the
increasing role that models play in environmental decision-making. Models
are playing three different roles: as policy catalysts; as devices for fleshing out
institutional mandates; and as regulatory strategies. Moreover, models are in-
creasingly the focus of policy and legal disputes. Despite the prevalence of
models and disputes over them, lawyers and policy-makers have not under-
stood them to be in their domain due to their technical and administrative
nature. In the second section, we show that while models may not be within
the conventional expertise of lawyers and policy-makers, they are relevant to
what they do. This is because modelling is a semi-autonomous, interdisciplin-
ary activity concerned with developing representations of systems which pro-
vide the rationale and basis of much regulatory behaviour. Or to put the
matter another way, models govern what is understood as legitimate regula-
tory action.
In the third section, we show how lawyers and policy-makers must not
only appreciate the relevance of models to what they do, but also the com-
plexity of models. We examine four particular types of complexity: technical,
institutional, interdisciplinary and evaluative. In the final section, we
argue there are three important conclusions that can be drawn from our
analysis. Models cannot be ignored by lawyers and policy-makers. Models
need to be treated with care by these groups and in thinking about models
there is also a need to reflect on what is understood to be the scope of law
and policy.
Five important points should be made before starting our analysis. First, this
article is not an article arguing for or against the validity of models. Our start-
ing point is that models are an inherent feature of environmental regulation.
Second, the focus of this article is upon identifying the generic features of
models which make them relevant and challenging for lawyers and policy-
makers to think about. Third, and related to this point, while the importance
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of regulatory and legal culture is central to our argument,1 in this article we
deliberately discuss a number of different jurisdictions in passing as we want
to highlight that models are an omnipresent feature of nearly all environmen-
tal regulation regimes. Fourth, in referring to lawyers and policy-makers we
define these two groups broadly to include all those involved in environmental
regulation decision-making and its review including those who wish to sup-
port or challenge regulatory decisions. Finally, we do not see our critical
agenda as an exhaustive analysis of the role of models in environmental regu-
lation. Much more could and should be said about models.2
1. The Prevalence of Models in Environmental Regulation
An obvious starting point in an article about models is to define what a model
is. The National Research Council (NRC), a prestigious science policy-making
body in the United States, organized a panel that has defined a model as:
a simplification of reality that is constructed to gain insights into select
attributes of a particular physical, biological, economic, or social system.
They can be of many different forms.3
This definition is bland but it is a good starting point for the simple fact that
most readers will recognise something familiar in such a definition. This is be-
cause, most environmental lawyers and policy-makers will have stumbled
across such‘simplifications of reality’ in their work and found themselves need-
ing to think about a particular model whether it be a model concerning climate
change, groundwater contamination, air quality, economic impact or some-
thing else. These models may be large scale and very complex or small and rela-
tively simple. Likewise, lawyers and policy-makers may interact with them
directly or may find themselves interacting with decisions based on a model
or based on particular interpretations of a model.
Our focus in this article is upon why lawyers and policy-makers find them-
selves engaging with models, and what they should keep in mind when they
do. Yet before we can discuss these two issues, we must provide a brief sketch
of the current regulatory landscapeça landscape in which models and dis-
putes over them are increasingly prevalent but despite that fact, lawyers and
policy-makers do not see models as relevant to what they do.
1 E Fisher, Risk Regulation and Administrative Constitutionalism (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2007).
2 W Wagner and others, ‘Misunderstanding Models in Environmental and Public Health
Regulation’ (2010) 18 NewYork University Environmental Law Journal 101.
3 National Research Council (NRC), Models in Environmental Regulatory Decision Making
(National Academies Press,Washington DC 2007) 31.
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1.1 The Prevalence of Models in Environmental Regulation
Models are now omnipresent in environmental regulation and they are playing
many diverse roles in both law and policy in different legal cultures.4 It is
thus impossible in one article to either collate or even summarise the use of
models in environmental law and we do not begin to attempt this. What is
useful to do, is to highlight the different functional roles that models are per-
forming in environmental regulation. Three large grouping of functions can
be identified.
First, there are policy-catalyst models which play a role in informing policy
in circumstances where no well established regime for regulatory action
exists. The use of models in early climate change policy is the most obvious ex-
ample here.5 Thus, for example, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change First Report was the foundation for the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change.6 These models are thus establishing the prem-
ises for future state action where no such premises existed before. With that
said, by acting as a foundation for new regimes they are then invariably incor-
porated into those regimes.7 Moreover, these models are often relied upon in
decision-making, the formulation of new laws8 and legal disputes.9
Second, there are those models that have as their purpose the fleshing out of
a discretionary legislative mandate by establishing the premises and rationale
for particular action within a regulatory regime.10 This very large group of
models are our primary focus and are best described as institutional mandate
models in that their primary function is to apply the institutional mandate
of a regulatory institution to the issues that that institution is dealing with.
4 For examples in US environmental law, see5http://www.epa.gov/epahome/models.htm4ac-
cessed 16 June 2010 and NRC, ibid 47^8.
5 S Jasanoff and B Wynne, ‘Science and Decision Making’ in S Rayner and E Malone (eds),
Human Choice and Climate Change ^ Volume One (Pacific Northwest National Laboratory,
Battelle Press 1998); D Farber, ‘Modeling Climate Change and Its Impacts: Law, Policy, and
Science’ (2008) 86 Texas Law Review 1655.
6 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ^
First Assessment Report (World Meteorological Organization/UNEP, Geneva 1990).
7 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report (IPCC,
Geneva 2007).
8 Council Directive (EC) 2008/101 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
19 November 2008 amending Council Directive (EC) 2003/87 so as to include aviation activ-
ities in the scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community
[2009] OJ L8/3.
9 The IPCC reports have been touched upon in numerous legal cases seeWalker v Minister for
Planning [2007] NSWLEC 741, [122]^[128]; Xstrata Coal Queensland Pty Ltd v Queensland
Conservation Council Inc [2007] QLRT 33; Case C-440/05 Commission v Council [2008] 1
CMLR 22, [93] per AG Mazak; Massachusetts v Environmental Protection Agency (2007) 549
US 497, 508; Small Hydro Power Developers’Association, v Transmission Corporation of AP Ltd
Appellate Tribunal for Electricity for New Delhi, MANU/ET/0033/2008. See also very indirect-
ly Dimmock v Secretary of State for Education & Skills [2007] EWHC 2288 (Admin).
10 K J Holmes and others, ‘Regulatory Models and the Environment: Practice, Pitfalls and
Prospects’ (2009) 29 Risk Analysis 159, 162. For a list of US examples see5http://cfpub.epa
.gov/crem/knowledge_base/knowbase.cfm4accessed 14 June 2010.
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The basis of that mandate is usually outlined in legislation but how that man-
date is interpreted will depend on the prevailing legal and institutional culture.11
An important point to appreciate here is that the institution operating
and utilising a model is nearly always administrative. That is, it is a non-elected
institution that has been delegated its mandate by a primary lawmaker.12
This occurs because modelling is part of assessmentçan information, expert
and communication-intensive process that can only be carried out by the
administrative arm of government.13 As we shall see, the fact that modelling
is primarily occurring within the administrative realm has significant conse-
quences for not only how models are understood, but also how lawyers and
policy-makers interact with them.
Institutional mandate models include models which play a background
policy-making role and those which directly inform particular decisions.
Examples can be seen in air quality,14 land contamination,15 hazardous sub-
stances,16 water quality,17 flooding risk,18 environmental assessment,19 genetic-
ally modified organisms20 and nature conservation.21 Moreover, it also
includes models deployed both formally and informally by private actors as
11 Fisher (n 1).
12 Ibid 19^22.
13 Ibid.
14 US Clean Air Act 42 USC x7409 (b)(1); Council Directive (EC) 96/62 of 27 September 1996 on
ambient air quality assessment and management [1996] OJ L296/55 arts 4 and 6; Council
Directive (EC) 2004/107 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December
2004 relating to arsenic, cadmium, mercury, nickel and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons in
ambient air [2005] OJ L23/3, Annex IV.
15 Department for the Environment Food and Rural Affairs, Guidance on the Legal Definition of
Contaminated Land (DEFRA, London 2008).
16 Toxic Substances Control Act 15 USC x2605(a); Council Directive (EC) 98/8 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 1998 concerning the placing of biocidal prod-
ucts on the market [1998] OJ L123/1 Annex VI, para 79; Commission Directive (EC) 95/36 of
14 July 1995 amending Council Directive 91/414/EEC concerning the placing of plant protec-
tion products on the market [1995] OJ L172/8, Annex II; Council Directive (EC) 2005/25 of 14
March 2005 amending AnnexVI to Directive 91/414/EEC as regards plant protection products
containing micro-organisms [2005] OJ L90/1, B.1.7.
17 Schedule 1,Water Act 2007 (Australia) and 33 USC x1313(d). See O Houck,The CleanWater Act
TMDL Program: Law, Policy and Implementation (Environmental Law Institute, Washington,
DC 1999).
18 Environment Agency, Flooding in England: A National Assessment of Flood Risk (Environment
Agency, Bristol 2009).
19 42 USC x4332(2)(C) (1982) and 40 CFR x1502.22 (1987). See also R Smith, ‘Lands Council v.
Powell and the Ninth Circuit’s Refusal to Blindly Refer to Unreliable Forest Service Science’
(2007) 28 Public Land and Resources Law Review 65.
20 Commission Regulation (EC) 641/2004 of 6 April 2004 on detailed rules for the implementa-
tion of Regulation 1829/2003/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards
the application for the authorisation of new genetically modified food and feed, the notifica-
tion of existing products and adventitious or technically unavoidable presence of genetically
modified material which has benefited from a favourable risk evaluation [2002] OJ L265/1,
Annex I, 2.E.5.
21 R Glicksman, ‘Bridging Data Gaps Through Modelling and Evaluation of Surrogates: Use of
Best Available Science to Protect Biological Diversity under the National Forest Management
Act’ (2008) 83 Indiana Law Journal 465.
Understanding Environmental Models 255
 at U
niversity of Texas at A
ustin on February 28, 2014
http://jel.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
part of the regulatory process so as to establish that a particular course of
action that a private actor wishes to take is valid under a regulatory regime.22
Examples here include the use of models in environmental impact assess-
ment23 and food and chemical licensing.24 The fact that all these models are
established with the primary purpose of fulfilling a legal mandate means that
these models are deeply embedded within the legal and institutional cultures
in which they are operating.
The final category of models is the emerging category of regulatory strategy
models.25 These models are tools for networking public and private actors
into collaborative decision-making. Regulatory strategy models are not just a
catalyst for action and/or an assessment tool but are also understood as a ve-
hicle for collaborative deliberation between a diverse set of parties.26 These
models are thus explicitly crossing the science/policy divide. Moreover, regula-
tory strategy models are expected to be dynamic and those involved in
decision-making are expected to be engaged with model development, inter-
pretation and utilisation. In some cases these models will be part of a formal
legal regime such as the EU Water Framework Directive,27 but in other cases
these models will be the focus of more informal forms of public/private nego-
tiated governance.28 The popularity of regulatory strategy models can particu-
larly be seen in the context of integrated assessment where models are
playing a significant role in reframing how historically sector-specific issues
are understood.29
In each of the uses described above, models are not simply plugged into the
regulatory machinery but are deeply intertwined into the structure and logic
of environmental regulation. At its most obvious, the role of models is now
being explicitly recognised in some legislative frameworks as part of the
22 Commission Regulation (EC) 641/2004 (n 20).
23 R (on the application of Edwards) v Environment Agency [2008] UKHL 22, [2008] 1WLR 1587.
24 Gulf South Insulation v CPSC 701F 2d1137 (5th Cir 1983); CaseT-13/99 PfizerAnimal Health SA
v Council [2002] ECR II-3305.
25 M Van Asselt and N Rijkens-Klomp, ‘A Look in the Mirror: Reflection on Participation in
Integrated Assessment from a Methodological Perspective’ (2002) 12 Global Environmental
Change 167; O Renn and P-J Schweizer, ‘Inclusive Risk Governance: Concepts and
Application to Environmental Policy Making’ (2009) 19 Environmental Policy and
Governance 174.
26 C Prell and others, ‘If You Have a Hammer Everything Looks Like a Nail: Traditional Versus
Partcipatory Model Building’ (2007) 32 Interdisciplinary Science Reviews 263.
27 Council Directive (EC) 2000/60 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October
2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy [2000] OJ
L327/1. B Page and M Kaika, ‘The EU Water Framework Directive: Part 2. Policy Innovation
and the Shifting Choreography of Governance’ (2003) 13 European Environment 328.
28 Directorate Generals for Economic and Financial Affairs ^ Enterprise ^ Transport and Energy
^ Environment ^ Research and Taxation and Customs Union, The Auto Oil II Programme: A
Report from the Services of the European Commission (2000) 5http://ec.europa.eu/environ
ment/archives/autooil/pdf/auto-oil_en.pdf4accessed 14 June 2010.
29 SEAMLESS and SEAMFRAME models integrating agricultural and environmental issues in
the European Community. See5http://www.seamless-ip.org/4accessed 14 June 2010.
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policy-making process30 and there are also examples where regulatory institu-
tions are producing substantial policy guidance concerning the use of models
by private and public actors in order to provide some oversight over their
use.31 Regulatory institutions such as the US Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), moreover, have bodies that oversee modelling practice.32 Most
regulatory institutions in advanced democracies have modelling departments
and dedicate considerable resources to modelling exercises.33 These modellers
are not isolated within the agency organisation, but instead are in regular
communication with the agency’s legal department, policy-making staffs and
enforcement units. This process of institutionalisation means that modelling
is part of the waft and weave of the regulatory fabric of a regime.34 Modelling
is not just fashion, easily shed with the new season, but rather is now a per-
manent feature in the institutional structure and logic of regulation.
1.2 Models and Disputes
It is not just that models are prevalent in environmental regulation, however.
Disputes over them are also increasingly prevalent. Those disputes can be
seen across all jurisdictions in both policy and legal contexts including polit-
ical debate, policy discourse, media discussion and specific legal disputes.35
In the policy sphere many of these disputes have been in relation to
policy-catalyst models. This is not surprising. As such models are establishing
the premises for potential state action, it is obvious they will be controversial
30 Council Directive (EC) 2008/50 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May
2008 on ambient air quality and cleaner air for Europe [2008] OJ L152/1; Water Act 2007
(Australia) Schedule One; US S Rep No 106-410 (2001), 90, reporting that the ‘Committee is
concerned that EPA has not peer-reviewed the 3MRA risk assessment model,’
5http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname¼106_cong_reports&docid¼f:sr
410.1064accessed 14 June 2010.
31 US EPA, Guidance on the Development, Evaluation and Application of Environmental Models (EPA,
Washington DC 2009)5http://www.epa.gov/crem/library/cred_guidance_0309.pdf4 accessed
16 June 2010; New South Wales Department of Environment and Conservation, Approved
Methods for the Modelling and Assessment of Air Pollutants in New South Wales (New South
Wales Government Gazette, Sydney 2005).
32 Council for Regulatory Environmental Modelling (CREM). See5http://www.epa.gov/crem/
index.html4accessed 14 June 2010.
33 The Environment Agency of England and Wales has an Air Quality Modelling and
Assessment Unit (AQMAU) and see the European Topic Centre on Air and Climate Change
which is contracted to the European Environment Agency.
34 US Government Accountability Office, Human Health Risk Assessment: EPA Has Taken Steps to
Strengthen Its Process, but Improvements Needed in Planning, Data Development, and Training
(Publication No GAO-06-595), 41.5http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06595.pdf4 accessed 16
June 2010.
35 D Michaels, Doubt Is Their Product: How Industry’s Assault on Science Threatens Your Health
(OUP, New York 2008); case studies in P Harremoe« s and others (eds), The Precautionary
Principle in the Twentieth Century: Late Lessons From EarlyWarnings (Earthscan Publications,
London 2002).
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with different actors arguing for and against such action.36 Moreover, these
disputes will also involve a range of public and private institutions as the
models in question are derived from a range of sources.37
Disagreements over climate change models are again the most high profile
examples of these types of disputes. Thus, for example, within popular science
literature there has been a critique of some of the climate temperature models
which have contributed to the understanding of climate change.38 Likewise,
the disclosure of emails derived from the hacking of the computer servers at
the Climate Research Unit at the University of East Anglia gave rise to a
debate over the validity of data related to particular modelling practices.39
Yet, policy disputes have also arisen in relation to institutional mandate
models. There has been ongoing political discussion and commentary concern-
ing the validity of models used in regulatory impact assessment and cost/bene-
fit analysis.40 Likewise, reports have focused on the validity of models used in
different regulatory areas.41 Particular controversies such as the banning of
flights in European air space due to volcanic disruption in Iceland also led the
models on which the ban was based to be discussed in the media.42
Disputes about models however, are not limited to the policy realm and
there have been a growing number of legal challenges to regulatory action
where models have been the focus. These disputes primarily concern judicial
and merits review of administrative decision-making. This development has
occurred in all jurisdictions, although most obviously in the United States due
to both a tradition of intensive judicial review and a legal culture of adversarial
legalism.43 The legal arguments concerning models have been striking in
36 For examples see the two papers making up ‘The Stern Review: A Dual Critique’ (2006) 7
World Economics 165; the issues raised in Downs v Secretary of State for Environment Food
and Rural Affairs [2009] Env LR 19; and A Macintosh, ‘The Garnut Review’s Targets and
Trajectories: A Critique’ (2009) 26 Environmental Planning And Law Journal 88. See the
case studies in Michaels (n 35), and B Lomborg,The Skeptical Environmentalist: Measuring the
Real State of theWorld (CUP, Cambridge 2001).
37 A W Montford, The Hockey Stick Illusion: Climategate and the Corruption of Science (Stacey
International, London 2010).
38 R Pielke and T Wigley, ‘Dangerous Assumptions’ (2008) 452 Nature 531.
39 E Kintisch, ‘Stolen E-mails Turn Up Heat on Climate Change Rhetoric’ (2009) 326 Science
1329.
40 B Ackerman and L Heinzerling, Priceless: On Knowing the Price of Everything and theValue of
Nothing (The New Press, New York 2004); S Shapiro, ‘OMB and the Politicization of Risk
Assessment’ (2007) 37 Environmental Law 1083.
41 Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, ‘Crop Spraying and the Health of Residents
and Bystanders’ (The Stationery Office, London 2005) [6.10]; Royal Commission on
Environmental Pollution, ‘Novel Materials in the Environment: The Case of Nanotechnology’
(Cm 7468, 2008) [3.115].
42 C Gammell, D Millward and B Waterfield, ‘Volcanic Ash Cloud: Met Office Blamed For
Unnecessary Six-day Closure’ Telegraph.co.uk (London 19 April 2010)5http://www.telegraph
.co.uk/news/7608722/Volcanic-ash-cloud-Met-Office-blamed-for-unnecessary-six-day-closure
.html4accessed 5 May 2010; P Marks,‘Can we Fly Safely ThroughVolcanic Ash?’ New Scientist
(London 20 April 2010) 5http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn18797-can-we-fly-safely-
through-volcanic-ash.html4accessed 5 May 2010.
43 R Kagan, Adversarial Legalism: The AmericanWay of Law (Harvard UP, Cambridge 2003).
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their diversity. Thus, for example, legal arguments directly relevant to models
have included:44 that the procedures for considering a model were procedural-
ly improper;45 that a model was oversimplified;46 that a model did not apply
to a specific factual situation;47 that the assumptions embedded in a model
were incorrect;48 that the data and statistics used in a model were flawed;49
that the model was not subject to adequate peer review;50 and that there was
a better model or source of information which could be used.51 There have
also been some striking examples of where courts and tribunals have ruled
that a specific model was incorrect.52
What is particularly interesting about these arguments is that nearly all of
them require judges and lawyers to engage with the inner workings of models
and the technical aspects of modelling practice. Moreover, while judges have
tended to stress their lack of competence53 and the importance of deference
to expert discretion,54 they have tended to consider arguments about models
and modelling at length.
A good example of the type of legal issues raises by models can be seen in
the recent English litigation concerning a challenge by a pesticides campaigner
to the Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affair’s (DEFRA’s) decision
not to implement no-spray buffer zones around agricultural land to pro-
tect rural residents.55 The dispute was legally complex involving as it did a
mixture of EU law, English principles of judicial review, and an intricate regu-
latory scheme. The claimant, Downs, argued (among other things) that there
44 Also see T McGarity and W Wagner, ‘Legal Aspects of the Regulatory Use of Environmental
Modeling’ (2003) 33 Environmental Law Reporter 10751.
45 R (on the application of Edwards) (n 23); McLouth Steel Products Corp vThomas 838 F2d1317 (DC
Cir 1988); and Chemical Manufacturers Association v EPA 28 F 3d 1259 (DC Cir 1994) (the MDI
case).
46 Small Refiner Lead Phase DownTaskforce v EPA 705 F 2d 506 (DC Cir 1983); Leather Industries Of
America v EPA 40 F 3d 392 (DC Cir 1994); and Flue-Cured Tobacco Co-op v EPA 4 F Supp 2d
435 (MD NC, 1998).
47 Small Refiner (n 46); MDI (n 45); Edison Electric Institute v EPA 2 F 3d 438 (DC Cir 1993).
48 Gulf South Insulation (n 24); American Iron & Steel Institute v EPA 115 F 3d 979 (DC Cir 1997);
Leather Industries of America (n 46); Downs (n 36).
49 American Iron & Steel Institute (n 48); Central ArizonaWater Conservation District v EPA 990 F
2d 1531 (9th Cir 1993); Flue-Cured Tobacco Co-op (n 46).
50 Flue-Cured Tobacco Co-op (n 46).
51 Case T-229/04 Sweden v Commission [2007] ECR I-2437; Downs (n 36); Ulan Coal Mines Ltd v
Minister for Planning [2008] NSWLEC 185.
52 Chlorine Chemistry Council v EPA 206 F3d1286 (DC Cir 2000); Xstrata Coal Queensland Pty Ltd
(n 9)
53 Downs (n 36) [38].
54 Small Refiner (n 46) 535; Case C-280/02 Commission v France [2004] ECR I-8573 and Australian
Pork Ltd v Director of Animal and Plant Quarantine [2005] FCA 671.
55 Downs (n 36); Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs v Downs [2009] EWCA
Civ 664, [2009] 3 CMLR 46. For a discussion of the case see L Warren, ‘Healthy Crops or
Healthy People? Balancing the Needs for Pest Control Against the Effect of Pesticides on
Bystanders’ (2009) 21 JEL 483.
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was a failure to properly implement the relevant EU directive concerning pesti-
cides.56 The information on which the decision had been made involved a
range of different studies and a risk assessment which included a model for by-
stander exposure. One of the claimant’s arguments was that this model was in
breach of the directive. The model had already been criticised by the Royal
Commission on Environmental Pollution (RCEP) and that criticism has been
subject to a response by DEFRA’s Advisory Committee on Pesticides (ACP).57
In the Divisional Court, Collins J sketched in outline the different views of
the parties on the adequacy of the bystander model but noted that ‘I am not
qualified to decide between those views nor is it an appropriate exercise for a
judge to undertake on judicial review’ unless there was evidence that the ap-
proach was ‘tainted by irrationality in theWednesbury sense’58çWednesbury
unreasonableness being the traditional and very high threshold test for sub-
stantive review in England and Wales.59 Collins J also concluded that ‘the
alleged inadequacies of the model and the approach to authorisation and con-
ditions of use have been scientifically justified’.60 Later on, in relation to a dif-
ferent point he additionally noted:
that a judge must be astute not to substitute his own view for that of the
decision maker unless the decision maker has failed to have regard to a
material factor, has had regard to an immaterial factor or has reached a
truly perverse decision. The defendant in this case was bound to act on
the advice given to him by experts. The advice conflicted and so he was
entitled to choose between them.61
Yet he also found that the claimant had produced ‘solid evidence . . . that resi-
dents have suffered harm to their health . . .or, at the very least, doubts have
reasonably been raised as to the safety of pesticides under the regime which
presently exists . . . It is clear that the precautionary principle must apply’.62
The failure to consider this evidence as ‘solid and that the conditions come
within the scope of the Directive’ was ‘a failure to have regard to material con-
siderations and a failure to apply the Directive properly’.63 The requirement of
‘solid evidence’ was derived from a European Court of Justice (ECJ) judgment
ruling on the same Directive where that Court found that
It follows from that provision [Article 5(1) of Directive 91/441], inter-
preted in combination with the precautionary principle, that, in the
56 Council Directive 91/414/EC of 15 July 1991 concerning the placing of plant protection prod-
ucts on the market [1991] OJ L230/1. For her arguments see Downs (n 36) [6].
57 For a discussion of this see Downs (n 36) [4^5] andWarren (n 55) 492^4.
58 Downs (n 36) [38].
59 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd vWednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223.
60 Downs (n 36) [39]
61 Ibid [64].
62 Ibid [40].
63 Ibid [47].
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domain of human health, the existence of solid evidence which, while
not resolving scientific uncertainty, may reasonably raise doubts as to
the safety of a substance, justifies, in principle, the refusal to include
that substance in Annex I to Directive 91/414.64
We will return to this judgment in a moment but it is also useful to note that
Collins J also concluded that the failure to consider skin and eye irritancy was
a failure to comply with the Directive.65
What this meant was that Collins J, through a different legal route, was ef-
fectively ruling on the adequacy of the model and in particular the types of in-
formation and exposure DEFRA had considered. This becomes particularly
obvious when the ECJ’s reference to ‘solid evidence’ is viewed in the context of
its judgment where it made clear that the phrase must be seen in light of the
principles of evaluation laid down in Annex VI of the Directive.66 Those prin-
ciples including references to modelling.67 ‘Solid evidence’ was thus evidence
which complied with principles of evaluation as set out in the Directive.
The case was appealed to the Court of Appeal. Downs argued that the by-
stander exposure model was not a ‘suitable calculation model for residents’,
the language of ‘suitable calculation model’68 coming from the Directive.69
Sullivan LJ concluded that:
The Appellant was entitled to have regard to the ACP’s views when con-
sidering what should be the Government’s response to the RCEP’s criti-
cisms of the current model. Given that eminent scientists could not
reach agreement as to whether there were significant shortcomings in
the existing model, but were agreed that an improved model should be
devised, even though they were not agreed as to whether it should be a
probabilistic model, it is impossible to conclude that there is any error,
much less a ‘manifest error’ in the Government’s conclusions which are,
in effect, that while the current approvals system is ‘suitable’ [for the pur-
poses of the Directive] . . . . . . because it is ‘at the forefront of internation-
al standards and provides adequate protection for both spray operators
and members of the public’ (paragraph 44, Defra’s Response), it should
be reviewed against a ‘more transparent model’ which is not currently
available, but which should be developed (paragraphs 45^6, Defra’s
Response).70
64 Sweden (n 51) [161].
65 Downs (n 36) [52].
66 Sweden (n 51) [167].
67 See B.1.5 of AnnexVI of Directive 91/414/EEC (n 56).
68 Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (n 55) [42].
69 Para 7.2.2. of Annex III of Council Directive 91/441/EEC (n 67).
70 Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (n 55) [53].
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In regard to the argument that DEFRA had ignored ‘solid evidence’ he con-
cluded that:
The Report, the Commentary and the RCEP’s Response all make it clear
that there is no consensus in the scientific community that there is
‘solid evidence’ as found by Collins J. In Defra’s response the Appellant
did not accept that there was such evidence (paragraph 81 above).
Collins J. was not entitled to substitute his own view for that of the
Appellant, and in the absence of such a scientific consensus, had Collins
J. applied the ‘manifest error’ test, he would have been bound to conclude
that there was no manifest error in the Appellant’s approach to the issue
of causality.71
Our analysis of the above does not do justice to what was a very com-
plex piece of litigation but these cases are paradigm examples of how
models become the focus in legal disputes. Moreover, it highlights three
things. First, despite statements that scientific issues were not within the
competence of judges, the judgments by the Divisional Court and the Court
of Appeal were both lengthy and detailed. This is even when, as with
the Court of Appeal, they ultimately upheld the decision. Second, the legal
arguments concerning the bystander exposure model were not just ‘Is
this right or wrong?’ but involved a series of complex and overlapping legal
arguments derived from different sourcesçwas the model a ‘suitable
calculation model’, was there ‘solid evidence’, was there a ‘manifest error of as-
sessment?’ These are all arguments with a very real legal dimension. Third,
the courts in these cases were not only engaging with the details of the by-
stander exposure model but also the administrative process in which it was
embedded.
1.3 The Lack of Sustained Engagement with Models by Lawyers and
Policy-Makers
At this stage in our analysis two points need to be made. First, there is noth-
ing novel in us identifying the important role models are playing in envi-
ronmental regulation. In recent years many academic commentators,72
71 Ibid [61].
72 Holmes and others (n 10); S Yearley, ‘Sociology and Climate Change After Kyoto: What Roles
for Social Science in Understanding Climate Change?’ (2009) 57 Current Sociology 389;
A Petersen, ‘Models as Technological Artefacts’ (2000) 30 Social Studies of Science 793;
S Rayner and E Malone (eds) Human Choice and Climate Change, Volume One: The Societal
Framework (Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Battelle Press, Columbus 1998); and
M Lahsen, ‘Seductive Simulations? Uncertainty Distribution Around Climate Models’ (2005)
35 Social Studies of Science 895.
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decision-makers73 and even novelists74 have pointed to the significance of
models. The most high profile has been the highly respected US NRC which
published Models in Environmental Regulatory Decision-Making in late 2007.75
Moreover, most of these publications have highlighted the complexity of
models.
Second, despite all of the above and the types of disputes seen in Downs,
most policy-makers and lawyers have shown little sustained interest in the
substance of models or the nature of modelling practice. These publications
have been met mainly with silence and there has been no ongoing policy or
legal dialogue concerning the nature of models, beyond the work of a few spe-
cialists. More significantly, on being faced with a model, many lawyers and
policy-makers are only interested in asking the ‘plain man’s question’, namely
does the model amount to a ‘real prediction?’,76 but they are not interested in
probing further.
As seen in the previous section, specific cases or disputes may force a
policy-maker or lawyer to engage with the inner workings of a particular
model but this engagement is invariably in the time-pressured context of that
case or dispute. In this context there is often a heavy reliance on different
forms of deference whether it be to particular experts, administrative institu-
tions, or decision-making processes.77 The discussion of any particular model
is in isolation and there is no precedent concerning models and just as a case
is distinguishable on its facts, it is understood to be distinguishable in regards
to the model.
We explicitly highlight this lack of sustained engagement with models by
lawyers and policy-makers because it has been ignored in much of the litera-
ture. Indeed, many articles on models proceed on the assumption that the rele-
vance of the substance of models to lawyers and policy-makers is self-evident.
Yet we would argue that is not the case. Moreover, we would argue that this
lack of substantive engagement is largely due to two different reasons.
First, models are perceived by lawyers and policy-makers to be ‘scientific’and
thus not within their expertise. Thus, while the outcomes of models are under-
stood as relevant to law and policy, the inner workings of modelsçfat tails, un-
certainty analysis, model coding, stochasticity, parameter variation, methods
of corroboration and so onçare all understood to belong to the province of sci-
ence. This view is of course not unfoundedçmodels present a ‘thicket of
73 P Pascual, ‘Wresting Environmental Decisions From an Uncertain World’ (2005) 35
Environmental Law Reporter 10539.
74 M Crichton, State of Fear (HarperCollins, NewYork 2004).
75 NRC (n 3).
76 J Ravetz, ‘Models as Metaphors’, in B Kasemir and others (eds) Public Participation in
Sustainability Science: A Handbook (CUP, Cambridge 2003) 75.
77 Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (n 55) [91] (assessing the view in the
scientific community); WTO Panel Report, JapançMeasures Affecting Agricultural Products
(Varietals), AB-1998-8, 22 February 1999, [8.32] (deference to expert panel).
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formulae and computer codes’,78 which require specialist knowledge to
navigateça thicket which is a barrier to understanding.
Second, for lawyers in particular, whose focus is upon law and its applica-
tion, models are seemingly too much part of what occurs in the back office of
administrative practiceçthey are not where the legal focus has traditionally
been. To engage with an environmental model is thus also to engage with
large expanses of the administrative landscape and its organisation and oper-
ation. Thus, cases in which models are subject to legal dispute often contain
lengthy examinations of the role of different decision-making bodies and their
relationship to each other. For example, in Downs both the Divisional Court
and the Court of Appeal spent much time explaining the relationship and
interactions between RCEP and ACP.79
The lack of engagement with models can thus be seen as due to a perception
that models are neither within the expertise or traditional domain of what law-
yers and policy-makers do. Yet what the disputes highlight in the last section
is that, despite this, models are clearly relevant in some way to what lawyers
and policy-makers do.What can be seen in cases like Downs is that the issues
to do with modelling cannot be untangled from legal questions. Models are
not just facts, but raise issues for the application of the law. This point was
well made by the Australian Federal Court in relation to another modelling
case where it noted:
There is an added level of complexity in cases such as the present where
the exercise of a statutory discretion is preceded by fact finding and it is
sought to allege that irrationality and capriciousness have tainted both
parts of the process and where the exercise of power is informed, in
part, by scientific predictions.80
Thus, in Downs the ‘bystander exposure model’ sparked arguments about
whether DEFRA had understood its legal obligations properly. Likewise, in
other cases, the use and interpretation of models has raised issues to do with
procedural fairness and legislative interpretation.81 These cases thus highlight
that models are relevant to what lawyers and policy-makers doçthe question
now raised is why that is the case?
78 Ravetz (n 76) 70.
79 See eg the discussions of the administrative frameworks in Downs and as re-described in
Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (n 55). Other examples include Case
T-13/99 Pfizer (n 24) and Australian Pork Ltd (n 54).
80 Lawyers for Forests Inc v Minister for the Environment Heritage and the Arts [2009] FCA 330,
[86].
81 Case T-13/99 Pfizer (n 24); R (on the application of Eisai Ltd) v National Institute for Health and
Clinical Excellence [2008] EWCA Civ 438, (2008) 11 CCL Rep 385.
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2. Why Models are Relevant to Lawyers and
Policy-Makers
To answer that question our approach is conceptual and returns back to two
more basic questions. What are the key features of models in environmental
regulation and what role are they playing in that context? In answering this
question it needs to be acknowledged that models have made a long, varied
and important contribution to the sciences and social sciences,82 but our
focus is only on their use within the regulatory context.
2.1 Five Key Things to KnowAbout Models
If we return to our bland definition of a model that we quoted in Section 1 it
can be seen that models are ‘a simplification of reality that are constructed to
gain insights into select attributes of a particular . . ..system’.83 Using this defin-
ition as a springboard there are five key things to note about models in envir-
onmental regulation.
First, models are simplifications of reality.84 Or to put the matter another
wayça model is not reality. A model of a river basin will only capture some
elements of that ecosystem just as a model of the solar system only captures
some elements of the planets and their relationship to the sun. In relation to
environmental regulations, models are particularly useful because the systems
they represent are so complex and open ended that they can be difficult to con-
ceptualise.85 As Oreskes notes:
Complex earth systems ^ such as the climate response to increased
carbon dioxide, the transport of contaminants through groundwater, or
the workings of a forest ecosystem ^ are difficult to address by traditional
scientific methods. An ecosystem cannot be brought into the laboratory;
the Earth’s climate cannot be the site of controlled experiments. If you
had proposed adding carbon dioxide to the Earth’s atmosphere to test its
effects, the experiment would have been rejected on ethical grounds.
Numerical simulation models provide an ethical and pragmatic means
to grapple with complex natural systems. 86
82 M Hesse, Models and Analogies in Science (University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame 1966)
and A Creager and others (eds) Science Without Laws: Model Systems, Cases, Exemplary
Narratives (Duke University Press, Durham 2007).
83 NRC (n 3) 31.
84 Ibid 31.
85 N Oreskes, ‘Why Believe a Computer? Models, Measures, and Meaning in the NaturalWorld’ in
J Schneiderman (ed),The Earth Around Us: Maintaining a Livable Planet (WH Freeman and Co,
San Francisco 2000) 73.
86 Ibid 73.
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Moreover, models are frames that enable ‘better questioning, exploration, hand-
ling and manipulation of the topic’.87 As frames, models will draw (among
other things) on both scientific theories about how a system works and avail-
able data about that system.88 Models may draw on a single scientific discipline
or many,89 and they may be adapted as information and disciplinary under-
standings change.90
One of the most common types of model used in environmental regulation
are computational models developed by selecting different elements of a
system and formalising relationships among these elements through mathem-
atical equations that are then codified in a computer program.91 That computer
program is not reality however. Nor is it a ‘truth telling machine’92 or a ‘fact’.93
Second, for a model to be able to provide insight it must be a rigorous repre-
sentation of reality. It must have a level of rigour that is defensible as fit for
the purpose in hand. A model of ocean currents which is based on no data
and a presumption that the world is flat is clearly inferior to one incorporating
ocean current data and grounded in the theory that the world is round. A
good model will be a coherent representation of a system that is based on
well-established scientific theories and relevant, quality data. To say this is not
to say that models are facts or that a model’s truth can be validated. Rather it
is saying that despite this, distinctions can be made in the quality of models.
Moreover, the quality of a model will determine the quality of the insight
which can be gained from it. Of course that raises the difficult question of
how quality is judged and who is to judge itçthis is an issue raised in many
of the disputes above.
Third, as a simplification of reality a model is constructed for a purpose or
set of purposes. That purpose is defined by the NRC as ‘gaining insight’94 but
this should be understood in context. In the environmental regulatory context
the main role of models is not so much to gain disinterested insight into a par-
ticular system but rather models are developed to assist decision-makers in dis-
charging their regulatory responsibilities. Those responsibilities can vary
dramatically but generally speaking models are concerned with assessing the
existing state of the environment, human health and the economy, and pre-
dicting impacts on these different things. This will be considered in detail in
the next section.
87 M Meyer, ‘Increasing the Frame: Interdisciplinarity, Transdisciplinarity, and Representativity’
(2007) 32 Interdisciplinary Science Reviews 203, 209.
88 M Morrison and M Morgan, ‘Models as Mediating Instruments’, in M Morgan and M Morrison
(eds), Models as Mediators (CUP, Cambridge 1999) .
89 Lahsen (n 72) 898.
90 I Grosse and others, ‘Ontologies for Supporting Engineering Analysis Models’ (2005) 19
Artificial Intelligence for Engineering Design, Analysis and Manufacturing 1.
91 NRC (n 3) 32.
92 Holmes and others (n 10) 161; NRC (n 3) 21.
93 NRC (n 3) 3.
94 NRC (n 3) 31.
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Fourth, the purpose or purposes for which a model is developed will directly
influence how reality is simplified. Thus, for example, if a model is being de-
veloped to assess water quality in a river then a model may represent water
flow, oxygen concentration and contaminants but is unlikely to represent how
many rocks are in the river or how many bridges cross it. In other words, the
regulatory purposes of a model will influence what it represents. Moreover,
the purposes of a model will directly influence how simplified the representa-
tion of a model is. Thus, for example, a model may be oversimplified to increase
transparency of a system or the use of a system by non-scientists.95 Models,
then are not just products of theory and data but are also shaped by the
priorities of the decision-makers who are deploying them.
Fifth, a logical consequence of all of the above is that modelling is an inter-
disciplinary activity. This is in two different waysçinternally and externally.
Internally, the process of modelling itself requires the integration of many dif-
ferent forms of information and assumptions from a variety of different discip-
lines.96 Thus, while modelling is a distinct activity, it is only semi-autonomous
in nature as it is drawing on a range of different disciplines.97 Modelling also
has an external interdisciplinary aspect because it is being carried out for a
set of regulatory and policy-making purposes. Modelling is not just a scientific
activity which is of relevance to policy-makers, but a scientific activity de-
veloped for policy-makers with the purposes of policy-making in mind.98
Indeed, a model can be understood as a ‘boundary object’ in that it is a tech-
nical ‘object’ that inhabits ‘several intersecting social worlds . . . and satisf[ies]
the informational requirements of each of them’.99
2.2 The Role of Models in Environmental Regulation
The discussion so far has established that modelling is a semi-autonomous and
interdisciplinary activity concerned with developing representations of reality
for a purpose or purposes where that purpose or those purposes will influence
how reality is represented. It is thus important to focus on the role of models
in environmental regulation. What such a focus makes very obvious is that
models are not just playing a back office and/or scientific role but rather are
making a major contribution to regulating administrative behaviour and thus
to establishing the legitimacy of administrative decision-making.
95 Holmes and others (n 10) 159.
96 P Pascual, ‘Avoiding Tragedies of the Intellectual Commons through Integrated Impact
Assessments’ (2007) 21Water Resources and Management 2005.
97 Morrison and Morgan (n 88).
98 In this regard it can be thought of as part of ‘regulatory science’. See S Jasanoff, The Fifth
Branch: Science Advisers as Policy Makers (Harvard UP, Cambridge 1990) 81.
99 S Leigh Star and J Greisemer, ‘Institutional Ecology, ‘Translations’ and Boundary Objects:
Amateurs and Professionals in Berkeley’s Museum of Vertebrate Zoology, 1907-39’ (1989) 19
Social Studies of Science 387, 393. Also see Pascual (n 96).
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As seen above, it can be generally said that models are an activity of assess-
ment. Assessment is the means by which regulators determine the existing
states of, and predict future impacts of particular activities on, the environ-
ment, human health, the economy and society. Most of the time, they will be
doing this in pursuance of their regulatory responsibilities. This is why institu-
tional mandate models make up the vast bulk of models in environmental
regulation. There are many examples of different assessment tools developed
by regulators for specific purposes such as risk assessment, regulatory impact
assessment and environmental impact assessment.100 Models can be inte-
grated into these tools but also can operate independently from them.
As part of assessment, models as workable representations of complex sys-
tems have three particular purposes. First, models are ‘succinctly encoded’
archives of existing knowledge about a particular system.101 The knowledge
that is being archived is often from disparate disciplinary sources including
monitoring data, epidemiology studies, toxicology studies and expert opinion.
Such information may also be of erratic quality and can range from raw obser-
vational data to theoretical assumptions. The way in which models can collate
knowledge makes their utility to the regulatory process obviousçthey in-
crease the potential that the weight of available information about a system
will inform regulatory decision-making.
The second purpose of models in the assessment context is to organise and
integrate this information by placing it into a formalised construct that relates
different pieces of information to each other. That construct is the simplified
representation of reality and as we saw above a model is a powerful frame
which aids focus.102 As such models will dictate what is relevant and irrelevant
to consider. Models are thus not just tools for collating information but also in-
terpreting and making sense of that information. The rigor and quality with
which a model does this can vary dramatically. Moreover, different models
will frame issues differently and thus result in divergent understandings and
interpretations of issues.103
The third purpose of a model is to serve as a tool of prediction. One aspect of
environmental regulation is that it is an ex ante activity which seeks to regu-
late future human activity.104 To do that, assessment tools are required to de-
termine what the potential impacts of that human activity are. Prediction is
an inherently uncertain process but models, by collating available information,
may potentially reduce those uncertainties. At the same time however, because
100 NRC, Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing the Process (National Academy
Press, Washington, DC 1983); C Sunstein, The Cost Benefit State: The Future of Regulatory
Protection (American Bar Association, Washington, DC 2002); J Holder, Environmental
Assessment: The Regulation of Decision-Making (OUP, Oxford 2005).
101 NRC (n 3) 25.
102 Meyer (n 87).
103 E Tufte,TheVisual Display of Quatntitative Information (Graphics Press, Cheshire 2001).
104 C Sunstein,The Partial Constitution (Harvard UP, Cambridge 1993).
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models are shaped by their purposes and uncertainty still exists, modelling is
neither a perfect nor a solely factual tool of prediction.
A single model may be developed for all three purposes or only one.
Likewise, a model may be developed for one purpose and used for another. In
all cases however, models are playing a role in ascertaining the relationship be-
tween the activity being regulated and the regulatory aim to be achieved. The
significance of this is that models are ascertaining the premises and rationale
of regulatory action. They are ascertaining the premises of regulation because
models, through the collation and interpretation of knowledge, are a tool for
identifying problems that need regulatory responses. They are establishing
the rationale because through interpretation and prediction a model can
direct what form that regulatory response should take.
In other words models, when relied on in regulatory decision-making, are reg-
ulating the power of a regulator in that a model is intended to ‘govern behav-
iour’,105 particularly in relation to defining what is reasonable action on the part
of a decision-maker. Models are laying down a blueprint for identifying which
decisions are ‘worthy’ to be recognised as authoritativeçor in other words as
legitimate.106 Models are thus playing a normative role in that they are part
of a decision-making framework telling decision-makers what they ought to do.
Our analysis above has been very basic, but this stark analysis helps in
aiding an understanding of why models, and in particular the inner workings
of models, are of relevance to lawyers and policy-makers. Models are clearly
setting the limits of legitimate action and therefore directly relevant to legal
and policy questions concerning what is it reasonable for a decision-maker to
do. If the model is understood to be legitimate, and it is followed by a
decision-maker, then the decision-maker’s decision is understood to be legitim-
ate. However, if the decision-maker, does not follow a model they are expected
to follow then the legitimacy of the final decision is open to question. Models
thus limit and direct regulatory power.
Yet the relevance of models does not stop there. If models are regulating
power then it becomes very important that the models themselves are legitim-
ate. As such, the substance and detail of models become relevant to lawyers
and policy-makers. If a model is understood as a rigorous representation of
reality then it can be understood as a legitimate basis for action. If a model is
understood to be of poor quality then it is not. That is why in cases such as
Downs the Divisional Court and Court of Appeal were faced with many argu-
ments about the legitimacy of the bystander exposure model and the other
types of assessment undertaken by DEFRA. If these exercises in modelling
and assessment were found to be problematic then so too would be the exercise
105 H Collins, Regulating Contracts (OUP, Oxford 1999) 7.
106 On worthiness and legitimacy see J Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society
(The Polity Press, Cambridge 1984) 178.
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of discretion based on that assessment. To put it bluntlyçthe quality of models
directly affects the quality of law and policy.
3. Models and Complexities
At this stage, the reaction of readers to our analysis of why models are relevant
to policy and law may be to conclude that the appropriate response is to rush
out to read a modelling textbook. But that is not our argumentçour argument
is that, on appreciating that models are relevant to what lawyers and
policy-makers, there is also a need to appreciate the intellectual challenges in
dealing with models. These intellectual challenges arise from the nature and
role of models in environmental regulation
Those intellectual challenges are many but here we begin to identify some
of them by discussing four different sets of complexities created by models in
environmental regulation. First, there is a set of technical complexities due to
the fact that models are representations of reality where data is imperfect, sys-
tems are not always well understood, and theories are capable of revision.
Second, there is institutional complexity because there is an ongoing interrela-
tionship between how models are developed and the institutional context in
which they are operating. The third complexity is interdisciplinary complexity
due to models straddling the science/policy divide. The fourth and final form
of complexity is that there is a need to evaluate the quality of models. This
however is not a straightforward task.
3.1 Technical Complexity
The first type of complexity is technical complexity. By this we mean that mod-
elling is complex due to the fact that it operates in conditions of uncertainty
and the structure and nature of models is open to variation. The technical
complexity of models has been well discussed by commentators arguing the
need for them to be treated with care and there is a voluminous literature on
the topic.107 That literature, while very valuable, can also be overwhelming to
the novice particularly because in identifying many different forms of uncer-
tainty it quickly becomes enmeshed in the technical detail. Moreover, at times
the literature can veer into Rumsfeldian farce with its discussion of different
107 K Beven, Environmental Modelling: An Uncertain Future? (Routledge, London 2009); N Oreskes,
‘Evaluation (Not Validation) of Quantitative Models’ (1998) 106 Environmental Health
Perspectives 1453; Jasanoff and Wynne (n 5); D Frame and others ‘Probabilistic Climate
Forecasts and Inductive Problems’ (2007) 365 Philosophical Transactions of the Royal
SocietyA 1971.
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types of uncertainty.108 Indeed, while those who write about uncertainty hope
to ‘de-mystify’ objectivity, their discussion of the concept can often do the op-
posite.109 For these reasons, in this section, we take a simpler route by high-
lighting the different sources of uncertainty and the different reasons why
models are variable.
The most important point to appreciate is that scientific uncertainty is in-
herent in all parts of the process of environmental modelling. As a first step,
the modeller must decide which elements of a system she should focus on; un-
certainty already pervades this choice, as the modeller exercises some expert
judgment in determining whether she has properly identified the components
driving the system she wishes to model. Secondly, the modeller collects data
about the system, a process replete with uncertainties about whether she has
chosen and properly applied the correct method to gather representative data
that characterise how the system operates. Even when the modeller has prop-
erly executed these first two steps, it is often the case that multiple mathemat-
ical equations can describe the same data set. It is therefore the case that
uncertainty inevitably permeates the development of environmental models.
When a model is used for a specific regulatory applicationçsuch as to estab-
lish discharge limits for nitrogen in an estuaryçanother source of uncertainty
arises. It is usually the case that the features of the system being modelled
vary over time and space. Because a model may have been developed based
on an initial set of conditions, the model developer and user must determine
whether a model is sufficiently robust to use even when these conditions have
changed. This determination, too, is subject to uncertainty.
In relation to each source of uncertainty, the nature of uncertainty will vary
depending on the available data and the rigour with which the features of a
particular system are understood. The natural environment is a holistic
system made up of numerous complex and little understood interrelationships.
Likewise social phenomena are not easily subject to predictive analysis and as
Rayner and Malone note we ‘have inaccurate and conflicting theories about
how and why people make choices, for themselves and in societies’.110 Thus,
for each source of uncertainty there is a range of methodological, epistemo-
logical and even ontological issues which manifest themselves as a tangled
web of complex uncertainties. Uncertainty is not always reducible through
additional data. Furthermore, irreducible ignorance about a complex system
108 D Logan, ‘Known Knowns, Known Unknowns, Unknown Unknowns and the Propagation of
Scientific Enquiry’ (2009) 60 Journal of Experimental Botany 712 and S Dovers and
J Handmer, ‘Ignorance, Sustainability and the Precautionary Principle’ in R Harding and
E Fisher (eds), Perspectives on the Precautionary Principle (Federation Press, Sydney 1999).
109 G Bammer and M Smithson (eds), Uncertainty and Risk: Multidisciplinary Perspectives
(Earthscan, London 2008) xiv.
110 S Rayner and E Malone (eds), Human Choice and Climate Change ^ Volume Four (Pacific
Northwest National Laboratory, Battelle Press, Columbus, OH 1998) 120.
Understanding Environmental Models 271
 at U
niversity of Texas at A
ustin on February 28, 2014
http://jel.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
will always be an inherent feature of modelling. It is for these reasons that the
literature on uncertainty in modelling can appear so impenetrable.
The fact that modelling is shrouded in uncertainty has three important im-
plications for policy-makers and lawyers. First, models cannot be expected to
deliver certainty. They cannot generate facts and they cannot generate defini-
tive answers. Any argument based on such an assumption is wrong. Likewise,
to criticise models for not generating certainty is also wrong. Second, it is im-
portant for policy-makers and lawyers to have some understanding about un-
certainty in modelling. Such an understanding significantly increases the
effective and proper utilisation of models as policy-makers and lawyers would
have a better appreciation of what it is valid to expect, and not to expect, from
models. Third, uncertainties (and the fact that models are developed for a pur-
pose) mean that embodied in models are also professional judgements, values
and assumptions about the world. These are often described as forms of un-
desirable subjectivity but the reality is that these features of models are neces-
sary to make models operate. The issue is thus not removing these
unavoidable features of models, but being able to evaluate the quality of these
assumptions. To do that, some transparency is required but the technical com-
plexity of models makes such transparency difficult to achieve.
Uncertainty also creates another form of technical complexity. In light of
uncertainty, a single physical system can be validly modelled in a number of
different ways. As Beven notes:
. . . . [A]chieving ‘the’model of an environmental system may be fraught
with difficulty. Instead, there may be different model structures, and par-
ameter sets within model structures, that are consistent in some sense
with the uncertainties in the available data, and many different ways of
estimating uncertainty in the predictions.111
In other words, models are not innately objective scientific constructs thatçif
done correctlyçyield a single, verifiable depiction of reality. Rather, even
when developed according to the best principles of science, models may yield
multiple versions of reality, each of which may be perfectly valid on its own
terms in a way that is logically consistent with the assumptions and frame-
work used to develop the model. This is a technical complexity in itself because
rigorous modelling is not an inflexible formula yielding strict results but some-
thing far more creative (albeit still highly disciplined).
Modelling is about fashioning and moulding data, assumptions, uncertain-
ties and theories. In this sense it is akin to sculpting112çit is inherently a
transformative enterprise in that as a semi-autonomous activity it is creating
111 Beven (n 107) 251.
112 Michaels (n 35) 68; J Smith and P Smith, Environmental Modelling: An Introduction (OUP,
Oxford 2007) 2.
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a representation. Recognising that fact is not to recognise that models are
simply fictions, but rather that modelling is working with highly malleable
matter. The consequences of this malleability is not just that a model can take
a variety of forms but also that there are real challenges in determining what
is a valid model. In light of the malleability, the determination of what is a
valid model cannot simply be on the basis of it conforming to a single con-
struct or a single processçother criteria need to be developed.
Again, all of this has major implications for policy-makers and lawyers.
First, there cannot be an assumption that modelling is about developing a
single perfect representation of a system. Any arguments based on this belief
are wrong. Second, it is increasingly clear that the characterisation of models
as being purely ‘scientific’ and ‘objective’ is naive. Indeed, a study of the tech-
nical complexity of models makes increasingly obvious the problematic nature
of understanding regulatory decision-making in terms of the science/policy
division. Third, and following on from above, a more sophisticated understand-
ing is needed of how to evaluate models. This is discussed in Section 3.4.
3.2 Institutional Complexity of Models
Models are not only technically complex however. They are also institutionally
complex.113 This is due to the fact that models interact with the institutional
context in which they operate. Moreover, the interactions between a model
and its institutional context are multi-dimensional and subtle and can seem
overwhelming to the uninitiated.114 Models are developed for regulatory pur-
poses and those regulatory purposes will influence how models are developed.
Models regulate power and thus their use relates to the legitimacy of regula-
tory decision-making. Models are increasingly institutionalised and the subject
of policy and legal disputes. Models are thus part of the administrative and
legal landscape. As with technical complexity, we do not aim to survey the
whole of institutional complexity but rather seek to highlight one aspect of
this complexityçthe way in which models are conceptualised in policy and
legal discussions is heavily dependent on what is understood to be legitimate
public administration.
As we saw above, models are playing a normative role in establishing the
authority of decisions. They are doing so against a background in which the
authority of regulatory decision-makers is more generally contested.115
113 Yearley (n 72).
114 This can particularly be seen in the related area of financial models. See G Tett, Fool’s Gold:
How Unrestrained Greed Corrupted a Dream, Shattered Global Markets and Unleashed a
Catastrophe (Little Brown, London 2009).
115 B Cook, Bureaucracy and Self Government: Reconsidering the Role of Public Administration in
American Government (Johns Hopkins UP, Baltimore, MD 1996); Fisher (n 1).
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The reason for this is not just that environmental issues themselves are contro-
versial116 but also, more significantly, because decision-makers are administra-
tive.117 Not only is it the fact that unelected administrative power has a
paradoxical position in liberal democracy, but the wide and opaque discretion
required in environmental regulation only exacerbates that paradox and
makes administrative power even more difficult to justify.118 Indeed, the history
of environmental regulation in most jurisdictions has been a history of an on-
going legal and policy debate about what is, and should be, the role of public
administration.119 A feature of this history has been how assumptions about
what a regulator should do influences what is understood a regulator is
doing.120 Legal and policy disputes are invariably about which assumptions
about good public administration should dominate.121
The issue in regard to models is thus what assumptions are made about
them by policy-makers and lawyers about what it is they contribute to the ad-
ministrative process to ensure that process is legitimate. In policy and legal de-
bates we can see two broad characterisations of modellingças an
analytical-deliberative process or as a method for generating truth. It is import-
ant to remember that these characterisations are based on assumptions about
what it is an environmental regulator is expected to do. They reflect the institu-
tional complexity of models because they highlight the fact that models are
understood and conceptualised in their institutional contextça context
which is contested.
The first characterisation of modelling is that seen in this articleçwhere
modelling is understood as an ‘analytical-deliberative process’. That is models
are understood as a process for helping frame issues so as to allow sharper
and more rigorous focus on them. This aids analysis, deliberation and problem
solving. Thus, as the NRC notes:
Models provide a framework that defines the relationships that are valu-
able to study and specify how measured quantities are to be interpreted
in the real world.122
By doing this a model allows for the development of more rigorous approaches
to examining a problem and allows for actors to discuss issues in a more
sophisticated way. At the same time, however, modelling is understood to be a
116 J Dryzek,The Politics of the Earth: Environmental Discourses (2nd edn OUP, Oxford 2005).
117 Fisher (n 1) 19^22.
118 Ibid.
119 S Shapiro and R Glicksman, Risk Regulation At Risk: Restoring A Pragmatic Approach (Stanford
UP, Stanford 2003); C Sunstein, Risk and Reason: Safety, Law and the Environment (CUP,
Cambridge 2002); T McGarity, ‘A Cost Benefit State’ (1998) 50 Administrative Law Review 7.
120 J Mashaw, Greed, Chaos and Governance: Using Public Choice to Improve Public Law (Yale UP,
New Haven 1997) 1^29.
121 Fisher (n 1) 53^241.
122 NRC, Understanding Risk: Informing Decisions in a Democratic Society (National Academy Press,
Washington DC 1996) 100.
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limited method due to uncertainty, the fact that a model is always a representa-
tion, and that the systems being modelled are holistic, open ended and dynam-
ic. Models don’t generate final answers but they do generate useful ‘insights’
that aid both deliberation and analysis.
This characterisation of modelling does not exist in isolation however.
If models and environmental problems are understood as complex then it
is also understood that the role of public administration must be about solving
complex problems shrouded in uncertainties. Indeed, understandings of
modelling as an analytic-deliberative method coexist with a more general
understanding of public administration as a deliberative-constitutive (DC) in-
stitution. By this we mean that public administration is understood to be con-
stituted as a substantive institution which is engaging in on-going problem
solving through the exercise of flexible discretion based on deliberation and
analysis.123
While the characterisation of modelling as an ‘analytic-deliberative’ process
is common among those who are either engaged in modelling or work closely
with models,124 it is not the characterisation that has predominated among
lawyers and policy-makers. This is not because these groups have formed any
strong views about the nature of models. Rather, their views of models have
been shaped by their views about the desired role of public administration
which they understand as needing to be as restrained and controlled as much
as possible.125 For this group, the DC paradigm with its emphasis on flexible de-
liberation and analysis is problematic because it grants too much discretion to
the decision-maker. Rather, those concerned with control of public administra-
tion have tended to promote the rational-instrumental (RI) paradigm of public
administration. On this basis, public administration is understood as akin to a
robot or a ‘transmission belt’126 that applies the ‘facts’ to specific legislative
commands. Facts include information rigorously policed by scientific and
social scientific methodology and preferences voiced through a fair, pluralist
participatory process.127 Reasonable RI administrative action is to carry out
this process of application in the most efficient and effective manner possible
and RI administration is understood as legitimate because the problems that
RI administration is dealing with are understood to be inherently manageable.
If the role of public administration is understood in RI terms then it be-
comes inevitable that models are understood as ‘truth generators’ producing
the truth which then can be applied to a legislative mandate. In other words,
123 Fisher (n 1) 30^2.
124 M B Beck (ed), Environmental Foresight and Models: A Manifesto (Elsevier, Amsterdam 2002);
E Fisher, ‘Drowning by Numbers: Standard Setting in Risk Regulation and the Pursuit of
Accountable Public Administration’ (2000) 20 OJLS 109.
125 Ibid.
126 R Stewart, ‘The Reformation of American Administrative Law’ (1975) 88 Harvard Law Review
1661.
127 Fisher (n 1) 29.
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models are not understood as representations produced for particular purposes
but rather as scientific reality. On this basis, modelling is presumed to be able
to capture reality accurately and uncertainty is an avoidable nuisance. For
models to be able to do this then reality needs to be presumed to be easily cap-
tured by the process of modelling. The problems created by open ended, holistic
ecosystems thus need to be downplayed. As is clear from our analysis so far,
this characterisation of models is simply wrong.128 Thus, while the account-
ability impulse behind the RI paradigm is understandable, the conceptualisa-
tion of models that it promotes is deeply misleading.
There are three implications of all of this. First, models are not understood
in isolation. The way in which models are conceptualised is highly dependent
on broader understandings of legitimate public administration and environ-
mental problems. Those broader relationships are summarised in Table 1.
Second, an implication of these relationships is that lawyers and
policy-makers will always be characterising models even when they are not ex-
plicitly engaging with them. Thus in the disputes seen above, lawyers and
policy-makers are making assumptions about models. For example, Collins J
understood the existence of what he understood as ‘solid evidence’ as a need
to rethink the model to make it a more accurate factual construct.129 The fact
it was not, meant, that for him, DEFRA was not in compliance with the
Directive. In contrast, the Court of Appeal understood the model as a heuristic
tool that captured general scientific consensus but which would change over
time.130 The point about these assumptions is that they are not based on
explicit engagement with models but rather are dependent on broader
Table1. Two paradigms of models and their relationship to ideals of good public administration and
understandings of environmental problems
Analytic-deliberative method Fact generating
Conceptualisation of
modelling
Models as constructs to assist in
problem solving,
deliberation and analysis
Models as scientific constructs
that produce truth.
Nature of environmental
problems and scientific
uncertainty
Complex and dynamic.
Uncertainty as inevitable
and irreducible
Manageable and easilyassessed.
Uncertainty as undesirable
and needing to be avoided.
Public administrationa Deliberative-constitutive:
constituted to engage in
ongoing, flexible problem
solving grounded in analysis
and deliberation
Rational-instrumental: limited
agent of the legislature that
applies the facts (including
public preferences) to
legislative mandates.
aFisher (n1) ch1.
128 Wagner and others (n 2).
129 Downs (n 36) [46]^[47].
130 Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (n 55) [76]^[91].
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understanding of public administration. Thus, Collins J analysis was resting on
a RI understanding of public administration and the Court of Appeal’s analysis
was resting on a DC understanding.
Third, what this means is that in thinking about models, lawyers and
policy-makers must also reflect on their understandings of good public admin-
istration and environmental problems. Indeed, the analysis above forces law-
yers and policy-makers to reflect upon the logic behind a RI model of public
administration in particular. While such a model is appealing because of the
control of public administration it seems to offer up, it is deeply problematic
in how it characterises the role a model can play.131
In highlighting these implications it should be remembered that the rela-
tionship between models and paradigms of good public administration is only
one aspect of institutional complexity. There are also many others. For lawyers
and policy-makers, the major implication of this form of complexity is that
models cannot be viewed in scientific and technical isolation but rather must
be analysed as part of the institutional context in which they operate. That
may require lawyers and policy-makers to broaden their intellectual field of
vision.
3.3 Interdisciplinary Complexity
The third form of complexity that needs to be engaged with in relation to
policy-makers and lawyers engaging with models is interdisciplinary complex-
ity. Interdisciplinary complexity has three main aspects.
The first type of interdisciplinary complexity is that models themselves are
often interdisciplinary constructs, particularly those models developed by inte-
grated assessment which incorporate knowledge and data from a range of
scientific and social scientific disciplines.132 How that integration occurs pre-
sents a series of intellectual and practical challenges. Not only may theory
and data differ from discipline to discipline, but the activity of modelling has
an iterative feedback to the different disciplines upon which it draws.133
Focusing on modelling thus highlights that the physical and social sciences
are not monolithic domains and the knowledge drawn on for regulatory
decision-making comes from a range of different disciplinary sources.134
Likewise, different models will be grounded in different disciplines. There is
131 Wagner and others (n 2).
132 J Rotmans and H Dowlatabadi, ‘Integrated Assessment Modelling’ in S Rayner and E Malone
(eds), Human Choice and Climate Change: Volume Three Tools for Policy Analysis (Battelle Press,
Columbus, OH 1998); H Nowotny and others Re-thinking Science: Knowledge and the Public in
an Age of Uncertainty (Polity Press, Cambridge 2001) 106; Pascual (n 99).
133 Rotmans and Dowlatabadi (n 132) 294.
134 J Kagan, The Three Cultures: Natural Sciences, Social Sciences, and the Humanities in the
21st Century (CUP, Cambridge 2009).
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no single modelling textbook or university course which will equip someone
with the ability to understand all models.
The second aspect of interdisciplinary complexity concerns the fact that
modelling is a distinct and highly technical discipline which must interact
with other disciplines and contexts. The problem is that policy-makers and
decision-makers need to engage with models, but it cannot be pretended that
in doing so they are modelling experts who have in-depth knowledge of model-
ling as a discipline. Modelling is a highly specialised practice distinct from
law and policy. The reluctance on the part of lawyers and policy-makers to
engage with models is thus entirely understandable. Models may span the sci-
ence/policy divide but it does not mean that it is easy for lawyers and
policy-makers to become modelling experts. Models are a product of particular
specialist bodies of knowledge and modelling is a discipline in its own right
with its own vocabulary, concepts and internal debates. Thus, while it is
common (and correct) to argue for modelling to be transparent,135 the chal-
lenge in doing so should not be underestimated. It is not the case that model-
ling is a hidden practice, but instead that the language and techniques of
modelling are opaque to non-modellers who lack the necessary background to
understand modelling arcana.
The third type of interdisciplinary complexity which arises from this is one
about accountability. There are some who have argued that interdisciplinary
discourses lead to greater accountability,136 but the reality is that holding
decision-makers to account becomes far more difficult when they are drawing
on a highly technical model. This is because it becomes far harder for a
decision-maker or lawyer to evaluate the quality of the arguments when they
are based on something that a lawyer and policy-maker finds difficult to
understand. Models thus may regulate administrative power but their role in
accountability processes is fraught. Indeed, when models do become the sub-
ject of legal and policy disputes, the ability of lawyers and policy-makers to as-
sess the accountability of decisions based on a model becomes questionable.137
There are two important implications of recognising interdisciplinary com-
plexity. The first is that while models are of relevance to lawyers and policy-
makers it is not the case that they are easily understandable by those groups.
Care and thought should be taken with how lawyers and policy-makers
engage with these models. Indeed, the policy and legal landscape are littered
with instances of where lawyers and policy-makers have engaged with
models in completely inappropriate ways.138
135 NRC (n 3) 100^11.
136 M Strathern, Commons and Borderlands: Working Papers on Interdisciplinarity, Accountability
and the Flow of Knowledge (Sean Kingston Publishing,Wantage 2004) 68^86.
137 Downs (n 36) [38].
138 For a discussion of this point see Shapiro (n 40); McGarity andWagner (n 44).
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Following on from this, it needs to be appreciated that lawyers and policy-
makers need to develop some form of expertise in dealing with models.
Clearly, it is not the same expertise as a modeller who is expected to directly
contribute to modelling as a discipline. Rather, the expertise that lawyers and
policy-makers need to develop is an expertise in interacting with modelling.139
This is a form on interactional expertise which is ‘[e]xpertise in the language
of a specialism in the absences of expertise in its practice’.140
The distinction between these two forms of expertise is difficult to draw and
care should be taken with that distinction.141 With that said, it is a useful dis-
tinction to draw because it clarifies the scope of interaction.142 Clarifying that
scope of interaction does not necessarily provide any simple answersçinter-
actional expertise is not a straightforward concept and developing even lin-
guistic expertise is difficult.143
By engaging with interdisciplinary complexity it is again seen that the sci-
ence/policy divide looks increasingly problematic, albeit in a different way
than discussed above. Interdisciplinary complexity arises from the fact that dis-
tinctions between policy and science do exist and thus there is effectively a
divide. At the same time, however that divide does need to be bridged and
crossed.
3.4 Evaluative Complexity
The final form of complexity that lawyers and policy-makers must consider is
the most significant ^ evaluative complexity. This is the most significant be-
cause the primary concern of lawyers and policy-makers in dealing with a
model is whether that model serves as a legitimate basis for a decision and, to
evaluate that, there needs to be a focus on the quality of the model. Indeed,
this was the fundamental focus of the NRC report Models in Environmental
Regulatory Decision-Making and it dedicated significant consideration to the
issue.144 As with above, we do not attempt to solve the problems created by
139 The distinction between contributory and interactional expertise is taken from H Collins and
R Evans, Rethinking Expertise (University of Chicago Press, Chicago 2007). See also H Collins
and others, ‘Trading Zones and Interactional Expertise’ (2007) 38 Studies in History and
Philosophy of Science 657.
140 Collins and Evans (n 139) 28.
141 S Jasanoff, ‘Breaking the Waves in Science Studies: Comment on H.M. Collins and Robert
Evans, ‘‘The Third Wave of Science Studies’’’ (2003) 33 Social Studies of Science 389; B
Wynne, ‘Seasick on the Third Wave? Subverting the Hegemony of Propositionalism: Response
to Collins & Evans (2002)’ (2003) 33 Social Studies of Science 401.
142 For a broader discussion of its use in environmental law see E Fisher and others ‘Maturity and
Methodology: Starting a Debate about Environmental Law Scholarship’ (2009) 21 JEL 213 at
231^5.
143 And often problematic because the same word can mean different things in different discip-
lines. See Kagan (n 134) 5^11.
144 NRC (n 3) 104^69.
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this form of complexity but cannot overstress the importance of recognising
this as a complexity in its own right. Indeed, nearly all the policy and legal dis-
putes seen above are disputes that raise issues to do with evaluative complexity
because in them lawyers and policy-makers need to evaluate the quality of
models which regulate decision-making.
Evaluative complexity largely arises due to the confluence of technical,
institutional and interdisciplinary complexity. Technical complexity means
that uncertainty is inherent in modelling and that modelling is malleable.
In terms of evaluating models this means ‘that while the rigor of a model can
be established it is impossible to verify the truth of a model’.145 Models can be
evaluated for rigour but cannot be validated as true (although they can be
invalidated for being false).146 It is for this reason that the term ‘model evalu-
ation’ is favoured over ‘model validation’.147 Yet, in focusing on the rigour of
modelling it needs to be recognised that modelling is an inherently malleable
exercise. Therefore, model evaluation cannot be about assessing whether a
model adheres to a strict formulaçat the same time, it is not the case that
‘anything goes’.148
Again, one response to this problem has been to argue that a way of evaluat-
ing models is to determine their fitness for purpose.149 As Morrison and
Morgan note, a model is not assessed ‘on its ability to accurately mirror a
system, rather the legitimacy of each representation is a function of the
model’s performance in specific contexts.’150 This would seem to offer a possible
way of developing a framework for evaluating models but it needs to be under-
stood this is not a purely functional and straightforward exercise but rather
one that encounters institutional complexity. Whether a model is understood
to be fit for purpose is not an objective or isolated question but will depend on
what is understood to be legitimate public administration. Moreover, as seen
above, the way in which models are conceptualised under the RI paradigm of
public administration is wrong. Therefore there exists a danger that models
will be judged against inappropriate yardsticks.
This problem is exacerbated by interdisciplinary complexity. Models do need
to be evaluated by lawyers and policy-makers but they are not modelling
experts. Thus, while models do enable decision-makers to base their deci-
sions on information, the technical nature of such models can prevent the
145 Oreskes (n 107).
146 NRC (n 3) 104.
147 Oreskes (n 107); B Beck, ‘Model Evaluation and Performance’ in A El-Shaarawi and W
Piegorsch (eds), Encyclopedia of Environmetrics (JohnWiley & Sons, Chichester 2002).
148 P Feyerabend, Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge (3rd edn Verso,
London 1993).
149 NRC (n 3) 3.
150 Morrison and Morgan (n 88) 28.
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evaluation of both models and the information on which they are being
based.151 With that said, what is clear from above is that while the technical
nature of models must be acknowledged, models are not simply scientific struc-
turesçthey are interdisciplinary ‘boundary objects’ and ‘infrastructures’152ç
and thus must be engaged with.153
Evaluative complexity does not end with the conflation of the forms of
complexity already discussed however. Another aspect of it is the fact that
regulatory actors will engage with models and utilise them to their own
ends. The different forms of complexity described above can thus be manipu-
lated for particular ideological or instrumental purposes.154 This form of
manipulation has been described by different commentators as ‘manufacturing
uncertainty’155 and ‘analytical opportunism’.156 The typical practice that
these labels refer to is where a regulatory actor, wishing to achieve a certain
regulatory outcome, will argue that the scientific uncertainty inherent in
models is a fundamental flaw which means that a model is not reliable.157
This type of manipulation is complicated by interdisciplinary complexity in
that it can be difficult to know whether such arguments have some merit.
The important point to appreciate is that the issue of evaluating models also
has a profoundly ideological and regulatory-outcome-driven dimension.158
Again that is the reason why modelling has become the focus for legal and
policy disputes.
We do not offer up any easy solutions to how lawyers and policy-makers
should evaluate models ^ we do not pretend that the process of evaluation
will be easy. This is particularly because lurking close to the issue of evaluative
complexity are broader problems stemming from an overly simplistic under-
standing of science and policy.159 What we do think is that it is essential that
the issue of evaluative complexity is on the agenda for lawyers and
policy-makers and that an important starting point is an appreciation of just
151 S Leigh Star and K Ruhleder, ‘Steps Towards An Ecology of Infrastructure Design and Access
for Large Information Spaces’ (1996) 7 Information Systems Research 111, 111.
152 Pascual (n 93).
153 G Bowker and S Leigh Star, Sorting Things Out: Classification and Its Consequences (MIT Press,
Cambridge 2000) 24, 34.
154 T McGarity and W Wagner, Bending Science: How Special Interests Corrupt Public Health
Research (Harvard UP, Cambridge 2008); W Wagner, ‘The Science Charade in Toxic Risk
Regulation’ (1995) 95 Columbia Law Review 1613.
155 D Michaels and C Monforton, ‘Scientific Evidence in the Regulatory System: Manufacturing
Uncertainty and the Demise of the Formal Regulatory System’ (2005) 13 Journal of Law and
Policy 17.
156 Fisher (n 1) 121^2.
157 W Freudenburg and others ‘Scientific UncertaintyArgumentation Methods (SCAMs): Science
and the Politics of Doubt’ (2008) 78 Sociological Inquiry 2.
158 Wagner and others (n 2).
159 Fisher (n 1); Michaels (n 35).
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how difficult an issue evaluation is. Thus, statements ensuring that models are
‘transparent’, and ‘fit for purpose’ should be treated less as solutions and more
as the serious intellectual and practical challenges they are.160
4. Conclusions
Our argument in this article has been that models are not just a prevalent fea-
ture of environmental regulation but they are also relevant to what lawyers
and policy-makers do and need to be engaged with critically. There are three
important conclusions that we draw from our analysis.
First, models cannot be ignored or overlooked by lawyers or policy-
makers. Models are not just the province of the scientific boffins and the
techno-heads. Models frame how environmental issues are understood, they
provide the basis and rationale for regulatory action, and they play a signifi-
cant role in establishing the legitimacy of regulatory regimes. Indeed the
increasing prevalence and institutionalisation of models in environmental
regulation, as well as the fact that they are subject to disputes, points to their
importance. Lawyers and policy-makers have no choice but to engage with
them.
Second, that engagement must take a critical and sophisticated form. We
have not set out in this article how that process of engagement should occur.
In light of the complexities discussed above, such prescriptions would be un-
helpful and counter-productive. One thing is clear howeverçthe real issue for
lawyers and policy-makers is how to properly evaluate the quality of models
and that requires not only engagement with evaluative complexity but also
technical, institutional and interdisciplinary complexity.
Third, the critical engagement with models cannot be seen in isolation
but also requires lawyers and policy-makers to reflect more generally on
the boundaries of their discipline. Much of the analysis in this article has
argued for lawyers and policy-makers to broaden their field of intellec-
tual vision. Models cannot be ignored just because they lie on the other side
of a disciplinary divide. Likewise, lawyers in particular, need to engage with
parts of the administrative process which they have not traditionally under-
stood as within their domain. A critical engagement with models is not then
just about learning a lot about models and their role in environmental
regulation but also thinking more carefully about what lawyers and policy-
makers do.
Thus, while in this article we have not dazzled, bamboozled or overwhelmed
you with technical jargon or data, we have laid down a serious intellectual
160 Pascual (n 96) 2011; Beck (n 147). On the abuse of transparency see Michaels (n 35) 176^91.
282 Elizabeth Fisher et al.
 at U
niversity of Texas at A
ustin on February 28, 2014
http://jel.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
challenge for lawyers and policy-makers. We have shown that models are
prevalent and relevant and require the development of a broad critical
agenda. What we have not done is provide any easy formulae or techniques
for how policy-makers and lawyers should engage with models and we know
that will frustrate many readers. As our analysis makes clear however, no
such formulae or techniques exist.
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